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ARTICLE
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: GOAL OR FEAR?
KENT GREENFIELD*
The conference that engendered this volume prompted a number of
scholars of corporate law to think carefully and deeply about the history of
corporate responsibility and about a range of current topics that occupy the
attention of academics and regulators. In these discussions with fellow aca-
demics, I found myself wondering about how our current moment will be
perceived in the future. When fifty or one hundred years from now our
intellectual descendants look back on the conference that took place at the
University of St. Thomas in 2013, how will the current moment be ana-
lyzed? What trends are we experiencing now that future scholars will feel
are worth studying and critiquing? This essay is merely a pondering of that
question—offered as a prompt to others and an invitation to my colleagues
to think through these matters with me.
My central assumption is that our current moment—like the history of
corporate responsibility and indeed all of corporate law to this point—can
only be understood within the context of broader intellectual and ideologi-
cal trends. It is not coincidental, for example, that the Gilded Age of the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw an emphasis on the pri-
vate nature of corporations as a rule of decision in both corporate law (see
Dodge v. Ford)1 and constitutional law (see Lochner v. New York).2 Simi-
larly, it was not happenstance that the Great Depression brought about a
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1. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down regulations based on the Due
Process Clause); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down regula-
tions based on the Commerce Clause).
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fundamental rethinking of not only the nature of corporations,3 but also of
the place of the market itself4 and the role of government in regulating it.5
Presently, we are experiencing a churning in the intellectual history of
corporate law theory and doctrine. There is now more openness to revisiting
the core questions about what corporations are, to whom they owe obliga-
tions, and how best to conceptualize them and their regulation than at any
time in a generation. This moment has been brought about because of the
increasing skepticism the public is showing toward corporations and the
people who manage them. The skepticism springs from a number of shocks
in the economic, environmental, and political fields that have revealed the
risks of unbridled corporate power, short-termism, managerial opportunism,
and Wall Street supremacy.
But this intellectual churning is not limited to the corporate law field.
The United States is also experiencing, in my view, the broadest debate
since the New Deal about the role of corporations in society and politics.
The spark for this debate was the 2010 decision of the Supreme Court in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,6 which validated the con-
stitutional rights of corporations to engage in political discourse and to
spend money from general treasury funds to influence electoral outcomes.
In some ways, the decision embodied the conventional wisdom about cor-
porations during the last few decades—namely that they are private institu-
tions best analogized to persons. The harshly negative reaction to the
decision, however, embodies the Zeitgeist of the current skepticism toward
corporations.
The interplay between these two trends—a questioning of the nature
and role of corporations in both the private and public spheres—may turn
out to be the defining characteristic of our current historical moment. It is
yet unclear, however, whether this questioning will result in any fundamen-
tal changes in corporate law and doctrine, constitutional law, or social and
political theory.
An irony exists in this concurrence of questioning in both the public
and private spheres. On the corporate law (private) side,7 the trend is to
3. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
4. See Robert Lee Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
5. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1–26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2006); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 §§ 1–37, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006); National Labor Relations Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935 & Supp. 1937) (protecting the right to bargain
collectively); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (1982) (creating a federal
minimum wage).
6. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7. Before I go too far, I must admit that I appear to be succumbing to the false private/
public dichotomy that I have previously railed against. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 40–71 (2006) (arguing
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challenge the corporation to broaden its role in society and enlarge the obli-
gations it owes beyond the mere pecuniary. There is a growing skepticism
toward shareholder primacy and increasing trends to call on corporations to
recognize and act on the interests of all of its stakeholders. The critics of
corporations are, in effect, calling on corporations to act as if they were
players not only in the private sphere but also in the public one as well—to
act, one might say, as citizens. This call on corporations to act as “good
corporate citizens” has resonance and meaning.8
Meanwhile, on the constitutional law (public) side, the trend is to chal-
lenge the corporation to stay within a narrow economic sphere and to focus
on the pecuniary implications of its activities. Corporate activity in politics
and the public sphere is viewed skeptically. The current effort to amend the
constitution to take away corporate “personhood” intends to take away con-
stitutional rights from all incorporated entities. The thought of corporations
acting as “citizens”—whether for progressive ends or not—is seen as non-
sensical at best, and destructive to democracy at worst.9
It has gone unnoticed until now that the work of the pro-corporate
citizenship activists often directly conflict with the work of the anti-corpo-
rate personhood activists, and vice versa. The arguments of “progressive”
corporate law scholars advocating for expanded corporate duties are now
being used to further the arguments of those wishing to expand corpora-
tions’ constitutional rights. The arguments of those opposing corporate con-
stitutional rights contradict and undermine the efforts of those who call on
corporations to take a more active role in society, which would protect the
interests of all corporate stakeholders. This tension is not between ends of
the ideological spectrum; it is primarily a tension between different compo-
nents of the ideological left. This essay explores how these two positions
are ultimately at odds with one another, despite their common critique of
corporate law.
that corporate law should be seen as public law). But my criticism of this taxonomy in the past has
been of the notion that doctrinal implications should flow from the distinction. Here, I am using
the dichotomy only as a descriptive; my only sin is to further hackneyed and questionable catego-
ries. A sin, yes. A mortal sin, no.
8. Indeed, some of the leading institutions in the field of corporate responsibility use “citi-
zenship” to embody their objective. See BOSTON COLL.’S CTR. FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP, http://
www.bcccc.net (last visited Oct. 5, 2013); CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, http://www.corporate-citizen
ship.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
9. See MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (cataloging a
broad movement to amend the Constitution to remove any constitutional protections for corpora-
tions); JEFF CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE: WHY THEY HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN
YOU DO AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2012).
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I. CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AS GOAL
For some time, “corporate citizenship” has been used as a synonym of
“corporate responsibility.”10 Corporations have corporate citizenship de-
partments and corporate citizenship reports.11 To be sure, no corporation is
saying that it is actually a citizen. Instead, the term indicates that the corpo-
ration has obligations that extend beyond the financial—that a corporation
can and should be measured not only by its bottom line, but also by its
behavior toward a broad group of stakeholders and society generally. In this
sense, corporate “citizenship” stands in contrast to “shareholder primacy,”
the notion that shareholder interests are the sum total by which corporations
should be measured.
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, shareholder primacy has
come under increasing attack. An article in the Harvard Business Review
recently proclaimed that “[t]here’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the
companies that are most successful at maximizing shareholder value over
time are those that aim toward goals other than maximizing shareholder
value. Employees and customers often know more about and have more of
a long-term commitment to a company than shareholders do.”12 A popular
non-business essayist in the New York Times wrote that “it feels as if we
are at the dawn of a new movement—one aimed at overturning the hegem-
ony of shareholder value.”13 An essayist in Forbes, hardly a bastion of Eu-
ropean socialism, called shareholder primacy “the dumbest idea in the
world.”14 The Atlantic ran an essay arguing that “shareholders are ruining
American business.”15 The senior managing director of the U.S. investment
firm Blackstone Group has said that the German practice of including em-
ployee representatives on the supervisory board of German corporations
10. See generally CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND NEW GOVERNANCE: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
CORPORATIONS (Ingo Pies & Peter Koslowski eds., 2011); BRADLEY K. GOOGINS ET AL., BEYOND
GOOD COMPANY: NEXT GENERATION CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP (2007); ANDREW CRANE & DIRK
MATTEN, BUSINESS ETHICS: MANAGING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010); HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON GLOBAL
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP (Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo eds., 2008).
11. See Corporate Citizenship, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/companyoffices/
aboutus/community/index.page (last visited Oct. 5, 2013); Corporate Citizenship, MICROSOFT,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013); Disney
Citizenship, THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, http://thewaltdisneycompany.com/citizenship (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2013).
12. Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jul.–Aug. 2012, at 50, 57.
13. Joe Nocera, Down with Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A.19; see also
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012).
14. Steven Denning, The Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value,
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/28/maxi-
mizing-shareholder-value-the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/.
15. Justin Fox, How Shareholders Are Ruining American Business, THE ATLANTIC (June 19,
2013, 10:05 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/stop-spoiling-the-share
holders/309381/.
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was one of the factors that allowed Germany to avoid the worst of the fi-
nancial crisis.16
I have written elsewhere that corporate law and doctrine should take
advantage of this moment to advance efforts to broaden the responsibilities
of corporations to include the interests of employees and other stakehold-
ers.17 Of course, the mechanism of how such an advancement could occur
is unclear at best, especially given the current hegemony of Delaware in
providing the corporate law of the United States.18 Having said that, there
are at least two recent occurrences that merit attention in this context, both
of which represent efforts to broaden corporate responsibility.
A. Ultra Vires as Mechanism to Enforce Law
The first is the current shareholder plaintiff suit against Hershey Cor-
poration based on allegations that the company is illegally using child labor
in its cocoa production efforts in western Africa.19 In itself, the case may
seem underwhelming. The suit merely asks the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery to allow the shareholders to inspect some of the corporation’s books
and records that would be relevant in the shareholders’ investigation of the
allegations.20 But the underlying theory of the case represents an innovation
that could have broader impacts beyond Hershey.
In an increasingly global world economy, corporations are involving
themselves more deeply in the laws and cultures of other national econo-
mies. Also, because of the nature of the global economy, an increasing
number of companies are working through subcontractors, suppliers, and
16. ALINE CONCHON, BOARD-LEVEL EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FACTS
AND TRENDS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.etui.org/Publications2/Reports/Board-level-em
ployee-representation-rights-in-Europe; see also MAP: Board-Level Representation in the Euro-
pean Economic Area, WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU, http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-
Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2/MAP-Board-level-representa
tion-in-the-European-Economic-Area2 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
17. See Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 749 (2014).
18. See GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 107–22.
19. La. Mun. Police Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., C.A. No. 7996-ML (2013). The author
filed an amicus brief in the case, along with Professor Nancy Gertner; see Amended Brief of
Professor Nancy Gertner and Professor Kent Greenfield, as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff;
see also Harvard Professors Tell Court Hershey Should Turn Over Child-Labor Records, TELE-
GRAM (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.telegram.com/article/20130412/NEWS/304128575/1002/busi-
ness; Phil Milford & Dawn McCarty, Hershey Should Supply Child-Labor Records, Academics
Say, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-12/hershey-should-
supply-child-labor-records-academics-say.html. On March 19, 2014, the Vice Chancellor denied
Hershey’s motion to dismiss the case. See Jef Feeley, Hershey Investors Suing Over Child Labor
Allowed to Produce Files, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.business
week.com/news/2014-03-18/hershey-judge-says-shareholders-can-seek-child-labor-files-1. The
Court has not, at the time of this writing, issued a final ruling.
20. The demand is pursuant to Inspection of Books and Records, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220
(West 2010) (“Any stockholder . . . shall, upon written demand under oath stating the purpose
thereof, have the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any proper purpose, and to
make copies and extracts from . . . [t]he corporation’s . . . books and records . . .”).
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middlemen to occupy stages of their production and supply chains that
would have traditionally been occupied by the company itself or by wholly-
owned subsidiaries.
One difficulty that this situation poses is how to hold corporations ac-
countable for illegalities committed overseas by their agents or business
partners. The problem has been recognized for some time—the most promi-
nent examples being the suits brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act
against Unocal Corporation for alleged violations of human rights in Burma
more than a decade ago,21 and more recently against Royal Dutch Shell for
alleged involvement in human rights violations in Nigeria.22 But in neither
of these cases was the corporation held accountable and indeed the jurisdic-
tional and doctrinal obstacles for liability are severe.
The suit against Hershey, however, is based on a different theory, one
that creates a mechanism within corporate law that operationalizes duties to
obey the law. The argument, first articulated over a decade ago,23 is that
corporations are empowered by their charters and state law only for “law-
ful” purposes and activities. Any unlawful activity, therefore, is “ultra
vires,” or beyond the power of the corporation. Thus any shareholder may
sue in the chartering jurisdiction to enjoin the unlawful activity, even if
such activity is alleged to be taking place overseas. Hershey is the first
company to be sued on the basis of this theory.
This theory could be very powerful since the duty to obey the law is an
area of Delaware law that is enforced only rarely, and that focuses on the
behavior of individuals within the company rather than the company itself.
It is now quite difficult to prove that individual directors should be subject
to personal liability for a failure to monitor.24 Nevertheless, if successful
this ultra vires theory will empower shareholders to protect their legitimate
interest in monitoring whether the corporation is acting unlawfully, even
when they are unable to show any individual director acted in breach of her
duties.
Also, this theory will allow shareholders, in effect, to import interna-
tional law and the law of foreign jurisdictions where the companies do busi-
ness into the domestic law of corporations. Corporations committing illegal
acts in jurisdictions that are unwilling or unable to enforce their own laws
against the companies will nevertheless be subject to shareholder action in
21. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th
Cir. 2005).
22. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
23. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279 (2001).
24. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (business
judgment rule applies to managerial decision as to extent of monitoring systems put in place);
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. Ch. 2006) (managerial liability only for “utter failure” to act in
good faith).
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state courts in the United States. The difficulty, of course, is that informa-
tion about alleged illegalities will be hard to come by. Thus, the result in the
Hershey books and records case will be worth watching.
B. Benefit Corporations
Another innovation worth watching is the advent of “benefit corpora-
tions,” a new type of business classification that is increasingly popular
around the country. Benefit corporations are for-profit corporations that are
also required to create “a material positive impact on society and the envi-
ronment and to meet higher standards of accountability and trans-
parency.”25 At the time of this writing, nineteen states—including
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—as well as Washington D.C.
have adopted legislation allowing corporations to opt in to the benefit cor-
poration framework of obligations.26 Even Delaware, the most popular state
for business incorporations, recently adopted a benefit corporation statute.27
The supporters of benefit corporations argue that the framework will
liberate businesses from the market demands of Wall Street and the legal
demands of shareholder plaintiffs seeking to hold management accountable
for decisions that fail to put shareholder interests first.28 They also say that
companies choosing the benefit corporation status can brand themselves as
green and society-minded. For example, Patagonia recently opted in to ben-
efit corporation status—a good test for this branding strategy.29 Also, the
advocates say benefit corporations will be able to prove that a focus on
more than shareholder return can have long-term benefits, which will not
only benefit the full range of a corporation’s stakeholders, but also the cor-
poration itself.30
25. THE BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, www.benefitcorp.net (last visited Oct. 5,
2013).
26. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP., http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-
state-legislative-status (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
27. S.B. 47, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013).
28. For a comprehensive description of the putative advantages of benefit corporations given
existing legal fiduciary obligations, see William H. Clark, Jr., et al., White Paper: The Need and
Rationale for the Benefit Corporation: Why It is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of
Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp
.net/storage/documents/Benecit_Corporation_White_Paper_1_18_2013.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2014).
29. John Tozzi, Patagonia Road Tests New Sustainability Legal Status, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/patagonia-road-tests-new-sustainabi
lity-legal-status.html.
30. Why B Corps Matter, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b-corps-matter
(“Business, the most powerful man-made force on the planet, must create value for society, not
just shareholders.”); Shelly Alcorn & Mark Alcorn, Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for
Social Change, ASSOCIATIONS NOW, June 2012, http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/ANowDe
tail.cfm?ItemNumber=179687 (“There is a strong case to be made for becoming a benefit corpora-
tion to gain a competitive advantage and attract investors . . .”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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I must admit some skepticism however about the advantages of benefit
corporations, for several reasons. First, they are voluntary. Once corpora-
tions opt in to the framework, certain requirements attach. But because the
decision to opt in is voluntary, the corporations that most need the strictures
of the framework are the least likely to choose it. Likewise, those that do
opt in could have behaved positively without the legal protection of the
benefit corporation status. Under the “business judgment rule” courts will
only set aside the decisions of management—of any company—if they are
tainted with self-interest or, more rarely, if management is grossly mis-
informed before acting. So, under current law, if a board wants to support
charitable causes, pay employees more, or voluntarily reduce pollutive
emissions, there is no doubt that they can do so without fearing legal re-
course. The problem, under current law, is not that management is prohib-
ited from acting with an eye toward society. The problem is that they are
not required to do so. Benefit corporation statutes do not solve this problem.
Second, these statutes do not protect companies from market pressure.
Because not all companies will choose to become benefit corporations,
those that do will suffer competitive disadvantage in the capital market, at
least in the short term. Some shareholders may accept the lower returns
implicit in the benefit corporation framework, but most will not. Thus, the
cost of capital will be higher for benefit corporations than for their non-
benefit competitors. The problem with this is that over time, a focus on
values other than shareholder profit will appear, in some cases at least, to be
hurtful to a company’s fortunes. The way to make sure attentiveness to
social needs will not hurt a company is to level the playing field—i.e., to
mandate such attentiveness by all corporations. This, of course, is not what
benefit corporation statutes do.
Third, these statutes might embolden other companies to act poorly.
Advocates of benefit corporations say that without such a framework com-
panies might be punished for doing the right thing. Although I think that is
a misreading of the law, a lot of people believe it. The push for benefit
corporation statutes will strengthen this misconception. The result may be
that companies that do not choose to become benefit corporations—that is,
most of them—will be able to say to shareholders, consumers, and commu-
nity activists that they should take their concerns elsewhere. In a way, a
company’s decision to not choose benefit corporation status will amount to
a branding strategy as well, but the opposite of what the benefit corporation
stands for. Wall Street will love it and managers of those companies will be
encouraged to act even worse than they do now.
In my view, the main question with regard to benefit corporation stat-
utes is whether the push for their enactment in so many states in such a
short time is either a reflection of a greater willingness by state legislatures
to consider fundamental changes to the way corporations are conceptual-
ized, or is actually a distraction from other more fundamental changes. If
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the former, then these statutes may be a precursor of things to come. If the
latter, then an emphasis on benefit corporations will take the air out of the
reform balloon.
In any event, the efforts by the advocates of benefit corporations show
one thing as a matter of certainty—many thousands of Americans, mostly
on the ideological left, want corporations to act with a broad view of their
responsibilities to society. That is, they want them to act more like citizens.
II. CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AS FEAR
Meanwhile, many thousands of Americans, mostly on the ideological
left, are increasingly calling on corporations to stay within their economic
sphere. To these Americans, the thought of corporations being citizens—
good citizens or not—is anathema.
The impetus for this fear of corporate citizenship, of course, was Citi-
zens United. The response to the opinion was massive and almost univer-
sally negative. Soon after the decision, as much as eighty percent of
Americans thought it was a mistake,31 and President Obama faced down
members of the Court at the State of the Union address, accusing them of
judicial activism.32 In the years following the decision, opposition to the
decision has remained high,33 and a movement to amend the Constitution to
overturn the decision is gaining serious traction. As of this writing, sixteen
states, nearly five hundred localities, twenty-seven U.S. Senators, ninety-
eight U.S. Representatives, and the President have endorsed an amendment
of some kind.34
The proposed constitutional amendments come in various forms,35 but
several of the most prominent proposals go beyond overturning Citizens
31. Gary Langer, In Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, the Public Dissents, ABC
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/02/in-supreme-court-
ruling-on-campaign-finance-the-public-dissents/; Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Su-
preme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2010), http://articles
.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-16/politics/36773318_1_corporations-unions-new-limits.
32. See Jesse Lee, President Obama on Citizens United: “Imagine the Power This Will Give
Special Interests over Politicians”, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 26, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/26/president-obama-citizens-united-imagine-power-will-give-
special-interests-over-polit.
33. A 2012 poll put the level of opposition at sixty-two percent. Andrew Joseph, Poll: Most
Voters Oppose Citizens United Decision, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nation-
aljournal.com/blogs/influencealley/2012/01/poll-most-voters-oppose-citizens-united-decision-20.
34. Lindsay Van Dyke, Support for Amending the Constitution to Overturn Citizens United is
One-Third of the Way There!, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE (Sept. 24, 2013, 7:51 AM), http://www
.freespeechforpeople.com/node/601.
35. Some proposed amendments are fairly specific and narrow. The so-called Udall amend-
ment, for example, would simply authorize Congress to enact reasonable campaign finance laws.
See S.J. Res. 19, 113th Cong. (2013). Others are broader, with the broadest purporting to end
constitutional rights for all entities not “natural persons.” See S.J. Res. 11, 113th Cong. (2013).
For a comparison of the bills currently being considered by Congress, see A Comparison of Con-
stitutional Amendment Bills Responding to Citizens United in the 113th Congress, as of August,
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United to make it clear that no corporation would receive any constitutional
rights at all. For example, the amendment proposed by the group Free
Speech for People, introduced in Congress by Representative Jim McGov-
ern of Massachusetts, states that constitutional protections are intended only
for “natural persons.”36 These amendments are part and parcel of a larger
attack on corporate involvement not only in politics but in society
broadly.37 To these activists, a central problem in U.S. politics is the “per-
sonhood” of corporations.
While this movement begins with a deep skepticism of corporate
power, the urge is exactly opposite to the urge within the corporate respon-
sibility movement. For the anti-personhood activists, the remedy is to keep
corporations within a narrow purview; for the corporate citizenship activ-
ists, the remedy is to ask the corporation to acknowledge and accept a
broader range of obligations.
I have been critical of the amendment movement on several grounds.38
Most crucially, I think the movement overstates the importance of “per-
sonhood” in constitutional law and understates the importance of corpora-
tions asserting constitutional rights, at least in some situations. Corporations
are not people, to be sure, but neither are unions, churches, Planned
Parenthood, the NAACP, Boston College, Random House, MSNBC, or The
New York Times. Under the amendment proposed by Congressman Mc-
Govern, all of these groups would lose their constitutional rights.
Also, it is worth emphasizing that more than free speech rights would
be lost. Organizations, such as those listed above, would also lose rights to
2013, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE (last visited Oct. 5, 2013), http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/
default/files/FSFP%20analysis%20of%20Citizens%20United%20amendments%20-%20August%
202013.pdf.
36. H.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. (2013).
37. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE 13 (2012) (“Most
Americans understand the fundamental truth that corporations are not people and that large corpo-
rations already have far too much power in America.”); Bill Moyers and Stephen Colbert Talk
Corporations, Racism, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/01/11/bill-moyers-stephen-colbert-corporations_n_1199503.html (quoting Moyers
as saying: “You cannot have a peoples’ democracy as long as corporations are considered peo-
ple.”); Jamie Raskin, Corporations Aren’t People, NPR (Sept. 10, 2009, 12:22 PM), http://www
.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112714052 (“The sovereign actors of American de-
mocracy—we, the people—have also understood that business corporations, which are magnifi-
cent agents of capital accumulation and wealth maximization in the economic sphere, pose
extreme dangers in the political sphere. Our best leaders have wanted business to prosper but
never to govern.”).
38. See Kent Greenfield, The Stakeholder Strategy, 26 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS 47
(2012); Kent Greenfield, A New Strategy to Fight Citizens United, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
14, 2012, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kent-greenfield/a-new-strategy-to-fight-c_b_
1882744.html; Kent Greenfield, Why Progressives Should Oppose A Constitutional Amendment to
End Corporate “Personhood”, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/kent-greenfield/why-progressives-should-o_b_1231884.html; Kent Greenfield,
How to Make the Citizens United Decision Even Worse, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/citizens-united-a-supreme-court-decision-that-is-widely-misunder
stood/2012/01/18/gIQAwa3nBQ_story.html.
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be free from warrantless searches, the seizure of property without due pro-
cess or compensation, and the right to jury trials. Congress could pass a law
saying that The New York Times could not pay their reporters, or that the
University of St. Thomas could not teach a course on Islamic law. Perhaps
Planned Parenthood could be raided without a warrant.
I also think that stakeholder theory itself offers the best potential rem-
edy to the harms of Citizens United. The key flaw of American corporations
is that they have become a vehicle for the voices and interests of an exceed-
ingly small managerial and financial elite—the notorious one percent. The
fact that corporations speak is less of a concern than whom they speak for
and what they say. The cure for this is more democracy within businesses—
more participation in corporate governance by workers, communities,
shareholders, and consumers. If corporations were themselves more demo-
cratic, their participation in the nation’s political debate would be of little
concern.
This is not to say that I support the decision or reasoning in Citizens
United. On the contrary, the decision was ham-fisted in applying First
Amendment doctrine, activist in reaching out to decide questions not neces-
sary to the case, and ignorant of the realities of corporate governance. But
one does not burn down a house to rid it of termites.
Yet all of this is beside my point in this essay. Here, I want instead to
focus on a descriptive point: the work of activists on the corporate citizen-
ship front conflicts with the work of the anti-personhood activists, and vice
versa. The core tenets of the progressive corporate law movement include
the principles that shareholders are not supreme and that corporations
should be measured by more than economic measures.39 For anti-corporate
personhood activists, two arguments often cited for limiting corporate rights
are that the shareholder owners should be protected from managerial misuse
of their funds,40 and that corporations should not engage politically because
they have only economic natures.41
One example comes from a debate I once had with John Bonifaz, who
is one of the amendment movement’s most capable leaders. The debate was
televised by WGBH here in Boston, and I pointed out that WGBH itself is a
corporation and that its programming ought to receive free speech protec-
tion.42 Under Bonifaz’s proposed amendment, WGBH would lose the pro-
tection of the First Amendment and indeed all other constitutional
39. See generally GREENFIELD, supra note 7.
40. Elizabeth Kennedy, Protecting Shareholders after Citizens United, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE (July 13, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/protecting-shareholders-after-citi
zens-united (“When shareholders’ invested money is spent on politics, millions of Americans are
stuck unknowingly contributing to political causes they may not themselves support.”).
41. See infra notes 45–48 (discussing dissent of John Paul Stevens in Citizens United).
42. Greenfield Talks to WGBH on Citizens United, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL (May 31,
2012), http://www.bc.edu/content/bc/schools/law/fac-staff/facultynews/2012/greenfield_wgbh_cit
izensunited.html.
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guarantees. Even Google, I suggested, should be able to demand that FBI
agents have a warrant before they search the contents of the company’s
servers.43 Bonifaz countered by asserting that, in the latter case, the share-
holders of Google—the company’s owners—could sue.44 His statement re-
vealed the underlying assumption of corporations as private property owned
by shareholders and used for their benefit. This is simply an assertion of the
shareholder primacy norm, which many progressive corporate law theorists,
including me, have been questioning for decades.
Bonifaz’s offhand statement would not be worth remarking on if it
were unique. But opponents of corporate rights often point to the ownership
status of shareholders and to their economic mandate of corporations to
bolster the argument that corporations should not be engaging in political
discourse or spending the shareholders’ money. Indeed, in Citizens United
itself, Justice John Paul Stevens penned the lead dissent and argued, among
other things, that corporate speech should be limited in order to protect
shareholders’ investments. Shareholders are seen as owners, as “those who
pay for an electioneering communication”45 and are assumed to have “in-
vested in the business corporation for purely economic reasons . . . .”46
Moreover, Stevens argued that corporate political speech did not merit pro-
tection because:
[T]he structure of a business corporation . . . draws a line between
the corporation’s economic interests and the political preferences
of the individuals associated with the corporation; the corporation
must engage the electoral process with the aim to enhance the
profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the argu-
ments for a broader . . . set of priorities.47
Stevens even goes on to quote the controversial ALI Principles of Cor-
porate Governance, saying that “a corporation . . . should have as its objec-
tive the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and shareholder gain.”48 It is as if the opponents of Citizens United
are so certain of the dangers of corporate political activity that they are
ready to throw stakeholder theory under the bus.
Of course the difficulties run the other way as well. The best current
example of how stakeholder theory is being used to broaden corporations’
constitutional prerogatives is in the context of the recent suits brought by
certain corporations to challenge the portion of the Affordable Care Act that
mandates employers to provide employee health insurance that includes
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 476 (quoting Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 201
(1998)).
47. Id. at 470 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
48. Id. (quoting ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
sec. 2.01(a), 55 (1992)).
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contraceptive care.49 As many as sixty suits are now pending across the
country, and two—one from the Tenth Circuit and one from the Third Cir-
cuit50—have already been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court and will
be decided in a matter of months. These cases turn on the question of
whether corporations may assert religion-based conscientious objections to
the contraceptive mandate. That question depends in part on whether the
corporations can have purposes and obligations that extend beyond their
economic interests.
The irony in these cases is that the corporations asserting the ideologi-
cally conservative argument that they should be free from government regu-
lation are using arguments often made by progressive stakeholder
theorists.51 The opponents of the corporations’ arguments, like in the Citi-
zens United context, contend that corporations should be held to economic
purposes only. For example, in the Tenth Circuit decision upholding the
corporation’s right to be exempted from the mandate, the court noted the
existence of benefit corporations as an example of the phenomenon that
corporations need not always be limited to solely economic purposes.52 A
concurring judge, like Stevens, used the ALI Principles as a source of in-
sight, but depended on a different reading:
But no law requires a strict focus on the bottom line, and it is not
uncommon for corporate executives to insist that corporations can
and should advance values beyond the balance sheet and income
statement. See ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations § 2.01(b) (2012) (“Even if corporate profit
and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in
the conduct of its business: . . . (2) May take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the
responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable
amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational
and philanthropic purposes.”)53
Meanwhile, the Third Circuit held against the corporation, reasoning
that an entity “created to make money could [not] exercise such an inher-
ently ‘human’ right.”54 A dissenter, however, also used the existence of
benefit corporations to bolster his point:
It is commonplace for corporations to have mission statements
and credos that go beyond profit maximization. When people
49. Birth Control and a Boss’s Religious Views, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at A.24; Lyle
Denniston, U.S., Business Appeal on Birth-Control Mandate, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 19, 2013, 2:29
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/birth-control-mandate-issue-reaches-court/.
50. Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 724
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
51. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381–83; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1120.
52. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135 n.10.
53. Id. at 1147 (Hartz, J., concurring).
54. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385.
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speak of “good corporate citizens” they are typically referring to
community support and involvement, among other things. Be-
yond that, recent developments in corporate law regarding “Bene-
fit” or “B” corporations significantly undermine the narrow view
that all for-profit corporations are concerned with profit max-
imization alone.55
The efforts of anti-personhood activists are not only in tension with
stakeholder theory on the conceptual level. In the political arena too, a ten-
sion exists if only because the potential for reform is a finite resource. If we
are indeed in a moment of potential for questioning the very framework of
how we view corporations and their obligations, we might make headway
on changing the obligations of corporations within corporate governance
law, or we might make headway by challenging their role in politics. It is
difficult to imagine that we could do both. This is especially true, of course,
when the arguments of one conflict with the other.
III. CONCLUSION
We are in the midst of a moment of real possibility of rethinking the
nature of the corporation. What are the purposes of corporations? To whom
do they owe obligations? Do they maximize their social value by focusing
on economic ends only, or should they be charged with broader social and
political obligations?
This essay discussed two ideas of how corporate power could be har-
nessed and constrained, specifically the use of ultra vires suits to enforce
laws otherwise left under-enforced and the creation of benefit corporations
empowered to pursue social goals. These are only two ideas among a host
of other ideas advanced by progressive critics of corporate power.
One very real obstacle to the achievement of these or other initiatives
is the disagreement within the ideological left about corporate citizenship.
Some critics of corporate power have long argued that corporations should
be charged with broader social goals, which could be seen as asking corpo-
rations to behave like good citizens. Other critics want corporations to stay
within a narrow economic sphere to protect the social and political sphere
from their influence.
This disagreement is more than merely theoretical. It embodies a fun-
damental disagreement among those most engaged in the project of ques-
tioning corporate power, and because of this disagreement the remedies
proposed by the two camps often conflict. Unfortunately, this tension has to
date been elided rather than explored.
55. Id. at 403 n.18 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
